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LOOSENING THE ADMINISTRATIVE HANDCUFFS:
DISCRETION AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
THE GUIDELINES
John M. Walker, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"),' trial judges had nearly unfettered discretion in
deciding whether and for how long a defendant should be incarcerated.2 Critics pointed to vast sentencing disparities and
charged that this system was "lawless."3 The Guidelines were
intended to respond to these concerns. Congress sought to
create a rational sentencing system which would structure sentencing decisions and reduce inequalities and uncertainties.4
As promulgated, however, the Guidelines have provoked intense opposition and outcry from the bar and, particularly,
from federal judges.5
The Guidelines have been described as "administrative
handcuffs that are applied to judges."6 According to one judge,

" United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Rachel D. Godsil, Esq. and Lynn K. Neuner, Esq.
in the preparation of this Article.
' See UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMIissIoN, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
' Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration,
101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992).
' Id.; see, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-50 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220-33; MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 118-24 (1972).
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt., at 1.2.
' See, e.g., Joseph Treaster, Two Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al; Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing
Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2; Jack B. Weinstein, A
Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 357 (1992); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF-THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 135-44 (1990).
0 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697 (1992).
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the Guidelines wiped away the human element from the sentencing process, and replaced it with "the clean, sharp edges of
a sentencing slide rule."7 According to another, "judges are
becoming rubber-stamp bureaucrats" and "judicial accountants."' These colorful metaphors no doubt reflect the frustrations of the district judges who must operate under the
Guidelines' regime, but I believe they overstate the situation.
In this survey of recent Second Circuit Guidelines decisions, I
hope to assuage the concern that, at least in this circuit,9 the
Guidelines have eliminated the human element from the sentencing process.1"
In a number of Guidelines cases decided in the last
term," our court confronted and sought to dispel the widespread but incorrect notion that the Guidelines preclude consideration of the defendant's character. And, to that effect, we
elucidated the framework and circumstances under which

Cabranes, supra note 5, at 2.
Weinstein, supra note 5, at 364.
Other circuits have also addressed this issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Hooker, 997 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Dillard, 978 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1982).
"oThis is by no means the sole focus of judges' opposition to the Guidelines. A
number of judges have voiced concern that prosecutors have gained the discretion
lost by judges, since the decision of what charges to bring determines the initial
Guidelines range. See Cabranes, supra note 5, at 13. See generally Ilene Nagel &
Stephen Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and
BargainingPractices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
501 (1992). A second significant concern is that, in drug cases, the sentencing
range is determined principally by the amount of drugs at issue rather than by
the defendant's role in the crime. Thus, a low-level drug "mule" carrying a large
amount of drugs may receive the same or even a higher sentence than the dealer
for whom he or she works. See id.; see also Stephen Labaton, Reno Moving to
Reverse Stiff Sentencing Rule for Minor Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at
A19 ("it's crazy that a convicted killer can be kicked out of prison to make room
for a drug mule"). Finally, concerns about sentencing under the Guidelines have
been conflated with the concurrent proliferation of mandatory minimum penalty
statutes enacted by Congress, resulting in sentences which many judges believe
are draconian, conducive to sentencing disparity and, when applied to non-violent
offenders, wasteful of scarce prison space. See generally Nagel & Schulhofer, supra.
These issues are beyond the scope of this Article, but have been thoughtfully addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 6.
" See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991).
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district courts are authorized to depart from the Guidelinesprescribed sentencing range. Our cases make clear that the
Guidelines have not transformed judges into computers confined to connecting dots on a grid when fashioning a sentence.
Rather, judges retain the discretion, and indeed are required,
to consider each defendant as an individual and to fashion
each sentence accordingly.
Although Congress and the Guidelines have not disenfranchised district judges to the extent many had feared, the
Guidelines have imposed new responsibilities on district
courts. Prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines, district
courts' sentencing decisions were almost completely discretionary; district courts were not required to explain their sentences
and appellate review was virtually non-existent.12 By contrast, sentences imposed under the Guidelines are subject to
appellate review and district courts are required to make specific findings on a number of issues and to explain and support
their decisions.13 These requirements help to ensure that district courts are applying the Guidelines correctly and that an
adequate record exists for the reviewing court.
For the uninitiated, Part I of this survey gives a brief
overview of the Guidelines. Part II then reviews recent Second
Circuit decisions that recognize district courts' sentencing
discretion and present circumstances in which district courts
are warranted in adjusting sentences outside of prescribed
Guidelines ranges due to offender as well as offense characteristics. Finally, Part III examines cases that spell out circumstances in which district courts must make specific findings
explaining their sentencing decisions.
I.

THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN A NUTSHELL

According to one commentator, the Guidelines "approach
in complexity and impenetrability the Internal Revenue
Code." 4 To understand the criticisms as well as the support
for the Guidelines, it is necessary to have a basic appreciation
of how they work in practice. It will be helpful, therefore, to

12

See Freed, supra note 6, at 1688.

"
14

See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
Cabranes, supra note 5, at 6.
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describe briefly the statutory framework undergirding the
Guidelines and the steps required of a judge in applying them.
The Sentencing Reform Act

A.

The Guidelines are the final step in a larger statutory
scheme, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA")."5 In passing the SRA, Congress announced its primary objectives to be
honesty in sentencing (which it proposed to achieve in major
part by eliminating parole); uniformity in sentencing for similar offenses and similar offenders; and proportionality of sentencing for conduct of differing severity.16
Under the prior parole regime, the United States Parole
Commission periodically reviewed sentences after the fact with
a view toward determining when a defendant should be released. 7 Defendants typically were eligible for parole after
serving a third of the sentence imposed. This system resulted
in a measure of public cynicism and reduced the accountability
of those within the criminal justice system."8 In place of parole, the SRA instituted "real time" sentencing, under which a
defendant serves the sentence actually received except for
relatively minor "good time" credits. 9
To address the disparity in imposed sentences, the SRA
created the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") and directed it to devise sentencing guidelines for federal
judges that manifested Congressional objectives.2" The SRA
provided for the Commission to be composed of seven members, including at least three federal judges. The Attorney
General and the chairman of the U.S. Parole Commission were
added as ex officio, nonvoting members. The Commission

" The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(1984) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86
(1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
" See Freed, supra note 6, at 1689.
IId.

Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAMiE L. REV. 1,
5 n.23 (1991).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
20 The sentencing objectives of Congress are largely set forth in 18 U.S.C.
"

§ 3553(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) and (d).
" 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988) (note).
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promulgated the first Guidelines in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual ("Manual"), with an effective date of November 1, 1987, and has reissued amended
Guidelines on the first of November each following year.22
The SRA also provided for appellate review of sentences in
cases where: (1) a sentence is imposed in violation of law; (2) a
sentence is imposed as a result of an incorrect application of
the Guidelines; (3) a court deviates from the sentencing range
prescribed by the Guidelines based on its power to depart; and
(4) a "plainly unreasonable" sentence is imposed for an offense
for which there is no guideline.'
B.

Sentencing Under the Guidelines

Before the district court sentences a convicted defendant
under the Guidelines, a probation officer conducts an investigation and presents his or her findings to the district court in a
presentence report, except in the rare case where the court
finds that there is sufficient information in the record to allow
"the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority." Both the
defendant and the government are permitted to respond to the
presentence report and to note issues in dispute.25 In resolving disputes over factors material to the sentencing determination, the sentencing court may consider any relevant information, even if that information would be inadmissible at trial
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. As long as the information "has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy," it may be considered at the sentencing phase.26
Once the district court has resolved the disputed factors and
given the parties an opportunity to object,27 the court follows
steps necessary to determine the sentencing range.
A district court judge's objective at this stage is to locate

2 For a discussion of the process by which the Commission formulates

the

Guidelines, see Freed, supra note 6, at 1693-96.
2
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1988); see Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty:
Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 629
(1992).
2' U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1.
Id. § 6A1.2.
2G Id.
27 Id.

§ 6A1.3.
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the appropriate sentencing range on a sentencing grid. The
grid assigns ranges at the intersection of a vertical column of
forty-three offense levels and a horizontal axis of six criminal
history categories. The judge then sentences the defendant
within that range unless he or she determines that departure
from the range is warranted by "aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind or to a degree ...not taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission."2 8
The offense level that determines the appropriate horizontal axis along the vertical column is derived from a base offense level tied to the charged offense of conviction and then
adjusted for factors relating to the defendant's behavior at the
time of, and subsequent to, its commission. To determine the
defendant's base offense level, the judge first finds the Guidelines provision that corresponds to the criminal statute of conviction. The base offense level set out in Chapter Two of the
Manual is a function of the perceived seriousness of the offense. For example, a starting offense level for drug cases depends largely upon the quantity of drugs attributed to the
defendant.2 9 Similarly, for offenses involving fraud or deceit,
the base offense level reflects the amount of money at issue."
When sentencing a defendant for conduct relating to racketeering, the base offense level is the greater of the offense level
applicable to the underlying racketeering activity or level 19
(which, without further adjustments and for a first offender,
would permit sentencing within a range of thirty to thirtyseven months)."
After locating the base offense level, the judge must then
adjust the level upward or downward based upon specific offense characteristics. This includes such factors as the use of a
firearm during the commission of the crime, whether death or
serious injury resulted from the violation of the statute of
conviction, and the amount of planning the crime entailed.3 2
Additional adjustments to the base offense level may result
upon consideration of "(1) the victim's characteristics, (2) the

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
29U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I(c) (Drug Quantity Table).
30 Id. § 2F1.1.
31 Id. § 2E1.1.
32 See, e.g., id. § 2D1.1.
28
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defendant's role in the offense, (3) whether the defendant obstructed justice, (4) the incidence of multiple counts,33 and (5)
whether the defendant accepted responsibility for his or her actions. 34
Finally, having settled upon the appropriate horizontal
axis, the judge determines one of six criminal history categories along that axis based upon the defendant's past conviction
record. As part of this process, the judge considers whether the
defendant's sentence must be enhanced by career offender
Guideline provisions3 5 which, in certain circumstances, provide for sentence enhancements for a defendant who has two
or more prior convictions 36 or has committed the offense as
part of his or her "criminal livelihood."37
Having arrived at the appropriate location on the grid and,
thus, the applicable sentencing range, the judge is required to
consider a number of factors before determining the precise
sentence to be imposed: the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, public
protection, the applicable sentencing range, policy statements
issued by the Commission, and the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities." The judge then either chooses a sentence within the range or decides to depart from it. It is the

' The Guidelines provide specific rules for increasing punishment for multicount convictions. See id., ch. 3, pt. D.
Selya & Kipp, supra note 18, at 7 (footnotes added).
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988) (requiring the Commission to ensure that
"career offenders" receive a sentence of imprisonment at or near the maximum
term authorized by statute). The statute is implemented in Guidelines § 4B1.1,
cmt. (backg'd). See also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). The Armed Career Criminal
statute is implemented in Guidelines § 4B1.4.
" For example, a defendant's sentence is enhanced under the "career offender"
provisions if he or she committed a "felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense," and "has had at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
Guidelines § 4B1.2 provides in part that:
(1) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state
law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
3' U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3, cmt. (backg'd) (implementing 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(2) (1988)).
38 Id.
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latter decision, whether or not to depart and, if so, how far,
which is the focus of Part II.
II. THE NATURE
DISCRETION

OF THE DISTRICT

COURT SENTENCING

Critics contend that the Guidelines virtually abolish consideration of the defendant's character and, instead, require
judges to fashion sentences based largely upon the offense and
not the offender. This view is widely held by district judges
and tends to be self-fulfilling. The unfortunate result is that
judges are inadvertently failing to carry out the congressional
mandate to consider "the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristicsof the defendant"39
when imposing a sentence.
Several defendant characteristics must be considered in
reaching the range assigned by the Guidelines, including the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility," criminal history,4 '
and dependance on crime for a livelihood.42 But the Commission determined that a single set of guidelines could not accommodate the panoply of imaginable human conduct, and, consequently authorized judges to depart from the Guidelines range
if the defendant or the offense diverges in relevant ways from
the "heartland" of typical cases foreseen and accounted for by
the Guidelines.43 A judge is therefore empowered to consider a
defendant's characteristics when evaluating whether to grant a
departure-either upward or downward-from the applicable
Guidelines range. Our recent decision in United States v.
Merritt" provides a vivid example of a defendant whose character and conduct fall outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines
cases, thereby warranting an exercise of judicial discretion to
arrive at an appropriate sentence.

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
U.S.S.G. § 3El.1.
41 Id. §§ 4A1.1-.3.
42 Id. § 4B1.3.
4 Id., intro pt. 4( C).
39 18
40

44

988 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1993).
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A.

United States v. Merritt

Merritt and AMG Services, Inc. contracted with the United
States Agency for International Development to supply and
ship high-quality powdered milk to the Democratic Republic of
the Sudan, which was facing a serious food shortage. 45 Merritt
instead shipped a cheap "milk replacer," generally used as
animal feed, which was not fit for human consumption and had
a foul taste and odor.
Merritt was charged in a twelve-count indictment and
entered into a plea agreement with the government under
which he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy with various fraudulent objectives.46 In the plea agreement, Merritt agreed to
make available prior to sentencing "all personal and corporate
financial information requested by the government."" Merritt
violated this promise by submitting forged documents to the
court and by stating falsely that of the $936,000 he had received, all but $75,000 had been disbursed to other parties. At
the sentencing hearing, the court found Merritt's base offense
level to be 16. The court made an upward adjustment of two
points for obstruction of justice, and one point for danger to
public health. The court then departed upward from the offense level of 19 (thirty to thirty-seven months) to the statutory maximum of sixty months' imprisonment because of
Merritt's continued fraudulent scheme to retain the proceeds of
his crime. 8
On appeal, Merritt contended that the district court had
no authority to depart upward from the Guidelines range by
reason of his concealment of assets and failure to pay restitution. He argued that these issues had been adequately considered by the Commission, and thus that any departure contravened the Guidelines. The Second Circuit, in an opinion written by then-District Judge Pierre Leval of the Southern District of New York (sitting by designation), rejected this narrow
conception of the appropriate role of departure. The court held
s Id. at 1300.
Count one charged him with "conspiracy to submit false claims to the United States, to defraud the United States in connection with a contract worth in
excess of $1 million, and to commit wire fraud." Id. at 1302.
47 Id.
4s

Id. at 1304-05.
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that, notwithstanding the Guidelines' policy statement admonitions that certain offender characteristics are "not ordinarily
relevant," in certain circumstances a failure to consider offender characteristics would contravene the statute. Citing 18
U.S.C. section 3553 and 28 U.S.C. section 994, Judge Leval
wrote: "The Sentencing Reform Act did not abolish consideration of the character of the defendant in sentencing. In
fact,.., the Act clearly ordered that the characteristics of the
defendant were to be a central consideration in the fashioning
of a just sentence."4 9
In Merritt, we stressed that in carrying out the Congressional mandate to consider defendant characteristics, the Commission left much to district court discretion. Unlike the detailed and specific categories of offense conduct, the treatment
of the defendant's character in the Guidelines is quite limited.
Congress enumerated a number of specific offender characteristics that the Commission was to consider in establishing
categories of defendants, such as age, education, vocational
skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition,
previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependance upon crime for a livelihood. ° However,
the Commission chose to incorporate only criminal history,5 1
dependance on crime for a livelihood,52 and acceptance of responsibility53 specifically into the Guidelines and, in a policy
statement, deemed the other characteristics "not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside
the [G] uidelines."54
Under this formulation, we held in Merritt that those
characteristics that are not "ordinarily" relevant may nevertheless be considered as a basis for departure when the circumstances fall outside the ordinary case. This inference is supported by the Guidelines' discussion of departures, in which

'9 Id. at 1306-07.
so 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(d)(1)-(11) (Supp. IV 1986); see Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial
Judge's First Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1,
12 (1987).
51 U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1-.3.
52 Id. § 4B1.3.
Id. § 3EL.1.
Id. § 5111.1-6 (emphasis added).
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the Commission asserts that "courts should treat each guideline as 'carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases' and
that, '[wihen a court finds an atypical case,' that 'significantly
differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted."'5 5 Given the infinite variety of human
characteristics, it is considerably more difficult to quantify the
effect on a sentence of offender characteristics than offense
characteristics. Recognizing this to be true, the Commission
chose to allow consideration of defendants' characteristics and
to authorize district courts to exercise discretion to depart in
the appropriate case rather than attempting to prescribe imperative Guidelines calculations for every conceivable set of
circumstances.
Applying this framework to the facts of the case in Merritt,
we held that the defendant's "profound corruption and dishonesty, and his elaborate fraudulent manipulation... designed
to preserve the huge benefits of his crime" were "not of a kind,
or to a degree"56 adequately considered by the Guidelines and,
accordingly, affirmed the district court's decision to depart
upward on this basis. Our opinion also noted that Merritt's
crime-substituting inconsumable animal feed for powdered
milk intended to provide relief to famine victims-was "so
heinous and [went] so far beyond the 'heartland' of fraud," as
to itself justify upward departure.5 7
B. Downward Departures
As Merritt makes plain, the Second Circuit endorses the
exercise of judicial discretion in response to Congress's requirement that a district judge consider defendants' individual characteristics."8 Last term, we affirmed the "traditional role of a
district judge in bringing compassion and common sense to the
sentencing process," and sought to avoid the danger that in
"the tangled wake of the Sentencing Guidelines,... district
judges will conclude in frustration that this role has been erad-

" United States v. Merritt,
U.S.S.G. intro. pt. 4(b)).
' Id. at 1310.
1 Id.
at 1312 n.11.
" Id. at 1312.

988 F.2d 1298, 1309 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:551

icated."59 This frustration was evidenced by a number of cases
in which district judges were under the mistaken belief that
they lacked authority to depart." Although ordinarily the failure to depart is not reviewable,6 we nevertheless remanded
these cases to provide the district courts with an opportunity
to decide whether to exercise their authority.
For example, we held in United States v. Mickens62 that
downward departure may be appropriate when the defendant
is a victim of spousal abuse and has maintained a clean record.
After a jury trial, Mickens' co-defendant was convicted of conspiracy, money laundering, and tax evasion63 for playing a
minor role in concealing a portion of the criminal proceeds
from Mickens' narcotics operation.' Because of his perception
that "his hands were tied," 5 the district court judge did not
depart downward on the basis of the co-defendant's experience
of marital abuse. In an opinion by Judge Frank X. Altimari, we
reversed, holding that the circumstances as the co-defendant
had portrayed them-a battered woman who paid a high price
for unfortunate choices she made while escaping her abusive
marriage and who now remains arrest-free, employed, and
financially supportive of her child-may warrant a downward
departure. 6 We remanded the case to the district judge to
make findings of fact and to exercise the discretion that is
uniquely his to determine whether a departure was warranted.
United States v. Rogers, 972 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1992).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Califano, 978 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam);

United States v. Mickens, 977 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1992); Rogers, 972 F.2d at 489.
"

United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1993) (district court's refus-

al to depart downward is not appealable unless the court mistakenly believed it
lacked the authority to do so).
62 977 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1992).
She was convicted of. (1) conspiring to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988); (2) money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B) (1988); and (3) evasion of currency reporting requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(3) (1988). Mickens, 977 F.2d at 70.
6 At the close of trial, the jury requested leniency in sentencing the co-defendant. On the basis of the jury's request, the district court downwardly departed
from the Guidelines range of 41-51 months and sentenced her to 18 months. The
government appealed and we reversed, holding that the district judge was required
to make an independent finding that downward departure was warranted. Id. at
73.
" Id. at 71.
66

Id. at 73.
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We have also held that significant efforts at drug rehabilitation provide a permissible basis for downward departure.67
In United States v. Maier, in an opinion authored by Chief
Judge Jon 0. Newman, we held that, notwithstanding a Guidelines policy statement that "[dirug or alcohol dependence are
not a reason for imposing a sentence below the
[G]uidelines," 5 a basis for departure could be found in the
defendant's willingness and dedication to achieve drug rehabilitation since these factors had not been adequately considered
by the Commission.6 9 In a similar vein, in United States v.
Cotto, we remanded the case to the district court to consider
whether departure for drug rehabilitation was appropriate
since, in rejecting defendant's request for such a departure, the
district court appeared to blend an exercise of discretion with
the mistaken view that a departure would be unlawful.7"
Other offender characteristics that we have held to provide
grounds for departure include extraordinary family circumstances,7 1 voluntary surrender and extraordinary acceptance
of responsibility,72 and criminal involvement in only a single
aberrant act.73 We have also upheld district court discretion to
depart downward from Guidelines ranges enhanced by the
career offender provisions74 and by inclusion of relevant conduct for which the defendant was acquitted.75
C.

Upward Departures

Some Guidelines-prescribed sentences do not adequately
reflect the severity of the crime committed or the aggravating
nature of the offender's characteristics. Merritt is an example
of such a situation; the fraud guideline, which was deemed to
' United States v. Cotta, 979 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Maier,
975 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1992).
68 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (policy statement).
" Maier, 975 F.2d at 948.
70 Cotto, 979 F.2d at 924.
"' United States v. Califano, 978 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United
States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
72 United States v. Rogers, 972 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1992).
7 United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1991).
' Rogers, 972 F.2d at 993.
' United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 163 (1993).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:551

be the most appropriate, did not adequately reflect the heinous
nature of the defendant's crime of substituting animal feed
unfit for human consumption in place of powdered milk intended for famine relief.76 Nor did the Guidelines range reflect
Merritt's elaborate scheme to retain the benefits of his crime
even after his guilty plea. In such circumstances, the district
judge's authority to depart upward is manifest.
A similar example of outrageous behavior was presented
in United States v. Alter." There, the defendant, an executivedirector and co-owner of a private halfway house under contract with the federal government, allegedly used his position
to obtain sexual favors from halfway house residents in exchange for money, drugs and promises of favorable treatment.
He pleaded guilty to one count of bribery.7" The district judge
upwardly departed after concluding that the adjusted base
offense level appropriate for the single count to which Alter
had pled guilty was inadequate because it did not account for
three aggravating circumstances, each of which required a
substantial upward departure. First, Alter's conduct was an
abuse of the warden/inmate relationship; second, the incident
had a "widely disruptive impact" upon the halfway house and
the federal corrections system; and finally, Alter had facilitated
drug abuse in the halfway house.79 In a per curiam opinion,
we noted that the upward departure may have been appropriate and remanded for further clarification of the district court's
reasoning.
In United States v. Bryser, ° we held that defendants' refusal to return the $3.7 million dollars they had stolen from an
armored truck permitted an upward departure from the sentencing range provided by the Guidelines."' An upward departure may also be warranted when the Guidelines sentence fails
to reflect the likelihood of recidivism, whether based on

71 United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1312 n.11 (2d Cir. 1993).
77 985 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1993).
7 Id. at 107.
79

Id.

so 954 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2939 (1992).

"1 Though we held as a matter of law that an upward departure was permissible, we remanded Bryser for resentencing because the district court had failed to
make a proper finding of fact that the defendants had control over the stolen
money. Id. at 90.
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defendants' prior aggravated felony convictions
nonsimilar, outdated prior convictions.8 3

2

or even on

Other Discretion-RelatedIssues

D.

Along with clarifying the district courts' discretion to depart, we have also loosened the Guidelines' straightjacket
somewhat in two other areas: section 5K1.1 motions for departure and reductions for acceptance of responsibility.
1.

Substantial-Assistance Motions

A court is authorized to depart below a Guidelines range
where a defendant has cooperated with the government, but
only upon a motion by the government under section 5K1.1
that states that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in an investigation or prosecution of another person
involved in criminal activity.' In late 1992, several groups
proposed amendments to the Guidelines that would give district courts authority to grant downward departures for substantial assistance absent a section 5K1.1 motion by the government." The Commission subsequently rejected these proposals.8 6
Nonetheless, we have held that district courts may review
the Government's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion to determine whether the refusal was based on bad faith
or constitutionally impermissible motives, such as racial bi-

E2

United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992).
United States v. Diaz-Collado, 981 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113

S. Ct. 2934 (1993).
84 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, cmt. n.1.
' United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts,
Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832, 62,842 (amendment proposal 24; suggested by Sentencing Commission; limited to cases involving first offenders where no violence
was associated with the offense), 62,848 (amendment proposal 31; suggested by
Sentencing Guidelines Committee of the American Bar Association; limited to cases
not governed by a mandatory minimum sentencing statute), 62,853 (amendment
proposal 47; suggested by Legislative Subcommittee of the Federal Defenders; no
limitations) (proposed Dec. 31, 1992).
" The Commission rejected these proposals on April 20, 1993. See Deborah
Pines, Amendments Approued to Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1993, at
1 (noting that Sentencing Commission had rejected proposal allowing judges, in
addition to prosecutors, to reduce sentences for defendants' substantial assistance).
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as."7 We recently remanded a case for resentencing where the
district court erroneously accepted the government's insubstantial reasons for failing to make a section 5K1.1 motion.' In
United States v. Knights, the government stipulated in a plea
agreement with the defendant that it would make a section
5K1.1 motion on his behalf if he testified truthfully. Knights
did so, but the Government refused to make the motion.
Knights appealed, asserting that the government had acted in
bad faith. The Government gave a number of reasons for its
refusal, 9 all of which we held were irrelevant or frivolous
except the claim that Knights's trial testimony was "inconsistent" with that of his brother. In an opinion authored by Judge
George C. Pratt, we remanded the case to the district court to
consider whether Knights's testimony was truthful, since if it
was, the government was obligated by the plea agreement to
make the section 5K1.1 motion.' Knights, therefore, teaches
that district courts must look carefully behind a government
refusal to fulfill its promise to make a section 5K1.1 motion.
2. Acceptance of Responsibility Reductions
Under the Guidelines, a district court has authority to
reduce a defendant's base offense level up to three levels for
acceptance of responsibility.9 Though this reduction usually
follows from a guilty plea, district courts have discretion to
reduce a defendant's base offense level for acceptance of responsibility even if the defendant goes to trial.92 In United
" United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.) (involving bad faith), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 969 (1990).
United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483 (2d Cir. 1992).
89 The Government argued that Knights's cooperation was untimely; that he
was more culpable than the co-defendant against whom he testified; that he pleaded guilty only because his brother had done so; that the plea agreement benefitted
him in other ways; that the clause in the agreement that promised the § 5K1.1
motion was not "something that was bargained for;" and that Knights's trial testimony was "inconsistent" with his brother's testimony. Id. at 1487-88.

go Id. at 1488.

91 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 55 Fed. Reg. 19,204 (1990) (as amended effective Nov. 1,
1990), 57 Fed. Reg. 20,156 (1992) (as amended effective Nov. 1, 1992).
92 United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 1993) (enforcing commentary to § 3E1.1 providing that defendant convicted by jury may receive acceptance of responsibility adjustment only where he went to trial "to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt"); see also United States v. Negron,
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States v. Moore,93 we affirmed such a reduction where a defendant decided to go to trial rather than plead guilty, since
after his arrest, the defendant promptly confessed his involvement in drug activities to authorities, family and friends. Writing for the court, Judge Ralph K. Winter stated: "[a]lthough
some sentencing judges might require a greater showing of
contrition, regret, or repentance, the district court was within
its discretion to reduce his Base Offense Level by two."'
After last term, it is clear that district courts within the
Second Circuit retain considerable sentencing discretion under
the Guidelines where the individual case is sufficiently out of
the ordinary. District court judges do not act as computers;
indeed, they must consider the totality of offense and offender
circumstances and sentence a defendant accordingly. But while
the Guidelines do not eviscerate all judicial discretion, they do
require a sentencing judge to articulate reasons for an exercise
of discretion.
III. THE NEED FOR EXPLANATIONS IN SENTENCING

In contrast to the current regime, a district judge in the
pre-Guidelines era was "free to roam at will throughout the
statutory range."95 Before the Guidelines, reasons rarely accompanied the imposition of sentences." Critics of such unbridled sentencing discretion complained about the judge's naked
power to impose a sentence without any responsibility to explain the "thought guiding the discretionary arrival at a sentence of twenty-two years rather than eighteen or twelve or six
and one-half."97
Today, a fundamental feature of Guidelines sentencing is
the requirement that articulable reasons support each sentence: both the reasons embodied in the Guidelines provisions
themselves and independent reasons to be articulated by the
district court upon departure or whenever it sentences within a

967 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1992).
93

"
's

968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 480 (1992).
Id. at 224.
Freed, supra note 6, at 1697.

9 Id.
"

Frankel, supra note 2, at 2045.
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range of two years or more. 9 This term, the Second Circuit
remanded a number of cases where district judges either failed
to make required findings or failed to provide adequate reasons
for their sentencing decisions. In other cases, we clarified sentencing standards to ensure appropriate Guidelines application.
A.

Drug Quantities

In drug cases, base offense levels turn primarily upon the
quantity of drugs involved. However, the Guidelines state that
"where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to
produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the relevant amount, the court shall exclude from the [Gluidelines
calculation" that amount.' To ensure accurate sentences, the
Guidelines require specific district court findings regarding the
relevant drug quantity whenever it is disputed.0 0
In United States v. Stevens, we remanded for the district
court to consider the amount of heroin the defendant was capable of producing when we found that "[tihe sentencing court
seems to have been unclear as to what quantity of heroin was
negotiated and to have been preoccupied with questions other
than Stevens's ability to produce as much as 500 grams."'
The district court referred to the quantity at issue variously as
"500 grams," "5 kilograms," and "one kilo.""0 2 With Stevens's
criminal history category of III, the sentence range for each of
these amounts was 97-121 months, 188-235 months, and 151188 months, respectively.'
Similarly, in United States v.
Maturo, defendant Pontillo contended that he was incapable of
importing the 25-28 kilograms of heroin ascribed to him by the
government.' The district court rejected this contention, but
failed to make explicit findings of fact to that effect.' Since

98 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
99 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, cmt. n.1.
'0' Id.; United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Maturo, 982 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2982 (1993).
101 985 F.2d at 1183.
102

Id.
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.

104 982 F.2d at 62.
105Id.
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there was evidence that supported both Pontillo's and the
government's opposing factual assertions, we were required to
remand the case for specific factual findings and consequent
resentencing.0 8
In conspiracy cases, we have similarly held that in order to
sentence a defendant based on the entire quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy, district courts are required to make a
finding that the defendant knew or reasonably should have
foreseen the amount of drugs involved." 7
Role in Offense

B.

District courts must also make specific factual findings
when enhancing a defendant's sentence based on his or her
In Stevens, the district court rejected
role in an offense.'
findings in the presentence report that Stevens was a middleman in the heroin conspiracy, but failed to state the factual
support for its conclusion that he was an "organizer" or "leader." The court noted that the criminal organization dealt with
five kilograms of heroin and, on that basis, concluded that the
thing." 0 9
organization was "far from being an ad hoc type [of]
In remanding the case for resentencing upon appropriate findings, we held that it did not suffice for the court to state that it
had "no doubt" that Stevens exercised control over the opera0
tion without providing evidentiary support for its view."
Conduct of Co-Conspirators

C.

In conspiracy cases, the Guidelines allow district judges to
attribute co-conspirator conduct to a defendant at sentencing. 1' However, the defendant cannot be sentenced on the
basis of criminal conduct of which he or she was unaware. To
that effect, the Guidelines provide that when sentencing a coconspirator under the "relevant conduct" guideline, a district
1C Id.

United States v. Lanni, 970 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Negron, 967 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1992).
1 8 United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1185 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1184.
11 Id.
m U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.1.
17
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court may consider acts committed by co-conspirators only

upon a specific finding that the defendant knew of the acts or
reasonably should have foreseen that they would be committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy."' The failure to make such
a finding resulted in a remand in United States v. Negron,"'
in which the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, and crack. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy,
but contended that he was only involved with distribution of
heroin. We remanded for resentencing where, over Negron's
objection and attempt to withdraw his plea, the district court
attributed to him the amounts of cocaine and crack seized from
his co-defendants without any findings as to Negron's knowledge of crack or cocaine or whether he reasonably should have
foreseen his co-defendants' possession of those narcotics."'
D. Obstruction of Justice
Under the Guidelines, when considering whether a
defendant's statements amount to an obstruction of justice
under section 3C1.1, sentencing judges are required to evaluate the statements "in a light most favorable to the defendant.""' We held this term that this standard applies to both
deceptive and non-deceptive, but nonetheless obstructionist,
statements." 6 With respect to a false statement, the district
court must determine that the defendant lied with the intent
to obstruct justice." 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court held recently in United States v. Dunnigan"8 that in order to enhance a sentence for a perjury obstruction, the trial judge must
make findings that satisfy all the elements of a perjury violation.
Non-deceptive statements, ranging from threats to witnesses to invitations to falsify testimony, may also be susceptible to various interpretations, and a sentencing judge must be
satisfied that such statements were made with the intent to
"- Id. at § 1B1.3, cmt. nn.2(b)-(c).
967 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1992).
114 Id.
at 72.
11

115U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.1.
116 United States v. Lew, 980 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1992).
17 United States v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419 (2d Cir. 1992).
1
113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993).

1993]

LOOSENING THE ADMINISTRATIVE HANDCUFFS

obstruct justice. For example, in United States v. Lew, the

district court assessed an obstruction of justice enhancement
based on Lew's statements to a co-conspirator that "he believed
the Government had entrapped them, that they should not
speak with the Government, and that they should cooperate.""' The government contended that these statements constituted an invitation to fabricate a defense. 2 ° Lew argued
that the statements were an attempt to warn his co-conspirator not to make up a story.' The district court agreed with
the government, though it characterized the evidence of obstruction as a "slim reed" and admitted that it was a "close"
call. 2 Because the statement had to be interpreted in the
light most favorable to the defendant, we held that its ambiguity precluded characterizing it as an obstruction of justice, and
vacated the sentence.'23
CareerOffender Status

E.

Finally, district courts must make specific findings when
determining whether cases are "related" under the career offender guidelines. The career-offender guidelines provide an
enhanced sentence for offenders who have been convicted of a
felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and who have at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. However, if prior convictions are "related," they will
be treated as one crime and, thus, by themselves cannot provide the basis for the career offender assessment. The commentary to section 4A1.2(a)(2) defines cases as "related" if "they
resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion,
(2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were
consolidated for trial or sentencing," and were not "offenses
that were separated by an intervening arrest."'25 In United

"0 Lew, 980 F.2d at 856.
120

121
1'2

Id.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.

123 Id.
124
125

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.3.
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States v. Chartier26 and United States v. Butler"' we held
that, when considering the "common scheme or plan" factor,
district court fact finding must include an evaluation of subjective as well as objective elements.12 In Butler, we remanded
for resentencing because the district court appeared to have
concluded, as a matter of law, that robberies that took place
over the span of several days could not be part of a common
scheme of plan.129 We observed that even unrelated crimes
committed at different times, such as arson and assault, could
be part of a single common scheme if both were committed to
extort something of value from a single person. Thus, we re.quired the district court to make a specific finding as to whether Butler's crimes were part of a common scheme or plan, or
somehow otherwise related. 13 0
CONCLUSION

The Senate Report to the SRA states that the purpose of
the Guidelines is to "provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences ...."' Our recent cases confirm that individualized sentences are not eliminated by the Guidelines
regime; indeed, our decisions draw attention to the need to
focus on offender as well as offense characteristics in imposing
sentences. However, our cases continue to uphold the requirement that any individualized sentence be supported by appropriate findings and reasons.

12 970 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1992).

1v 970 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 480 (1992).
8 Id. at 1024.
1'2Id. at 1025.
130Id.
131

S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3182, 3235, cited in United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1307 n.3 (2d Cir.
1993).

